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WHY NOT MERGE THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (IMF) WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK)?*
DOMINIQUE CARREA U*
INTRODUCTION
WY,,J not merge the International Monetary Fund ("IMF' or
'Fund") with the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment ("World Bank" or "Bank")? To raise such a question in itself
appears sacrilegious. This question does not, however, belong exclusively
to the realm of intellectual provocation. The respective development of
both the IMF and the World Bank since their inception some fifty years
ago justifies querying their independent existence, beyond any facile or
trite remarks on the excessive cost of international bureaucracies that
could be reduced by merging these two giant specialized agencies of the
United Nations.
This interesting question is not raised only because it coincides with
the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods "twins"-as the IMF and
the World Bank are commonly called. It was already raised some twenty
years ago (in January, 1976 to be precise) by that respected journal, the
London-based Economist,I which was, to the best of our knowledge, the
first observer to speculate about the advisability of the continuing sepa-
rate existence of the IMF and the World Bank.2 Since then, the same
view has surfaced periodically, albeit always presented in interrogative
form.
The gist of the arguments are easily summarized. When the IMF and
the World Bank were created at the Bretton Woods Conference of July,
1944, their founding members assigned them precise and distinct func-
tions, as evidenced by their very titles. The Fund was to be a kind of
international non-profit organization designed to promote a code of good
monetary behavior and to assist its member States with balance of pay-
ments (i.e., short-term) difficulties.3 The World Bank was to be a profit-
oriented international organization aimed at financing projects that
member States in a phase of reconstruction or development could not
afford to fund.4 Over the years, the boundaries between the two institu-
* Address given by Professor Dominique Carreau on April 7, 1994 as part of the
Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Professor of Law, University of Paris-I, Pantheon-Sorbonne.
1. Do We Need an IMF?, The Economist, Jan. 17, 1976, at 81.
2. See id. at 82.
3. See infra part I.A.
4. See infra part I.B.
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tions grew more indistinct: the IMF became increasingly involved in
long-term financing while losing the essential elements of its normative
powers5 and the World Bank became drawn into program-lending and
country-lending. 6 Thus, since the two Bretton Woods institutions share
the same areas of activity-developing nations and, more recently, assist-
ance to the systemic transformation of planned economy (or socialist)
countries into market economy (or capitalist) countries-it would appear
legitimate to contemplate a merger.
The arguments that can be put forward to justify the initial speculation
will be developed below, though without recommending a particular
course of action as this would run contrary to an academic approach. It
is up to each interested person to make up his or her own mind as to the
desirability of a possible IMF/World Bank merger and as to the choice
of the absorbing institution-a relatively secondary issue, except, natu-
rally, for the officials involved.
In order to understand the background of the issue, it is necessary to
review the creation of the IMF and the World Bank and to examine the
major features of their development that show clear signs of convergence.
I. THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK As DEFINED BY THEIR
CONSTITUTIVE CHARTERS
A. The IMF Under Its Articles of Agreement
The tasks assigned to the IMF by its founding members are manifold,
but can be broken down into two distinct but inter-related categories.
First, the IMF was set up as an institution based on the concept of inter-
national cooperation between States. 7 It constitutes a typical co-opera-
tive organization, similar to other United Nations specialized
institutions. Its role is to apply this concept to its sphere of activity,
namely monetary policy.' The Fund's primary task is "[t]o promote in-
ternational monetary cooperation"9 and, in the same vein but in more
concrete terms, "[t]o give confidence to members by making the Fund's
resources temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards." 10
This refers to the institution's lending operations.
Second, the IMF received powers to establish norms that proved to be
a formidable innovation in international monetary law." Specifically,
5. See infra part II.A.
6. See infra part II.B.
7. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I, 60 Stat. 1401, 1401-02.
8. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I(iii), 60 Stat. 1401, 1401.
9. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I(i), 60 Stat. 1401, 1401.
10. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I(v), 60 Stat. 1401, 1401.
11. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
arts. I, VIII, 60 Stat. 1401, 1401-02, 1411-13.
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the Fund was required to promote and enforce the code of monetary
good conduct established at Bretton Woods, which was characterized by
a system of stable exchange rates devoid of "competitive exchange depre-
ciation."' 2 A further requirement was the "establishment of a multilat-
eral system of payments in respect of current transactions" 3-for
example, a certain type of currency convertibility. These objectives were
specified in other provisions of the Fund's Charter that made them en-
forceable. 4 Article IV describes in detail the rights and obligations of
member States regarding the implementation of exchange rates' 5 and Ar-
ticle VIII concerns members' other obligations with a special emphasis
on currency convertibility. 6 Finally, a specific provision, Article XIV,
enables member States to derogate provisionally from their obligations
under Article VIII.' 7
The IMF's two main functions, cooperative and normative, are closely
linked. Clearly, States agreed to limit their traditional monetary powers
by living up to demanding international obligations because they were
entitled to receive sufficient financial assistance when needed-for exam-
ple, in the event of a balance of payments deficit. In other words, the
partial loss of monetary sovereignty by member States was compensated
by the right to receive assistance. It was up to the IMF to manage this
delicate and highly volatile equation.
B. The World Bank Under Its Articles of Agreement
By and large, the World Bank seems a much simpler and more limited
institution than the IMF. This is illustrated by the very title of the other
Bretton Woods twin. The purpose was to give birth to a bank whose role
would be to act as an intermediary on the markets between prospective
investors and prospective borrowers. 8 In other words, the World Bank,
like any other domestic bank worldwide, was required to play a tradi-
tional intermediary role by borrowing funds on the markets for re-lend-
ing to its customers, with its capital acting as collateral for its
undertakings. It is not very different from any other bank except that it
is an inter-State organization: its members-its shareholders-are States
only and its loan beneficiaries must also be nation States or their agen-
12. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I('ii), 60 Stat. 1401, 1401.
13. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. I(iv), 60 Stat. 1401, 1401.
14. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
arts. IV, VIII, XIV, 60 Stat. 1401, 1403-06, 1411-13, 1420-21.
15. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. IV, 60 Stat. 1401, 1403-06.
16. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. VIII, 60 Stat. 1401, 1411-13.
17. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. XIV, § 3, 60 Stat. 1401, 1420-21.
18. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. I(i), 60 Stat. 1440, 1440-41.
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cies.19 From a legal point of view this is a very key feature as it means
that the Bank's lending operations, which take the form of international
treaties, are subject to and protected by international law. Otherwise, the
World Bank operates like a regular bank. Even though its loans must be
earmarked for reconstruction 20 (now a moot point) and for the develop-
ment of "productive facilities and resources in less developed coun-
tries," such loans are granted only for profitable operations based
exclusively on "considerations of economy and efficiency. ' 22
Thus, unlike the IMF, the World Bank has not been endowed by its
founding members with any norm-creating functions. Similarly, the
Bank's Articles of Agreement bear no trace of a financial code of good
conduct accepted by the member States regarding the treatment of for-
eign direct investment.
The absence of normative rules in the World Bank's Articles of Agree-
ment can be explained by two sets of reasons of varying importance.
First and foremost, it is not within the normal scope of a bank, whether
domestic or international-i.e., inter-State-to encourage or impose
upon its clients a particular type of behavior. When granting loans,
banks have to ensure that they will be repaid in due course on the agreed
terms and that they will be adequately guaranteed in the event of default.
Any bank that meddles in its clients' business management runs a serious
risk of incurring liability if the clients have financial difficulties. In short,
normative functions are alien to bank lending.
Second, had the World Bank been granted normative powers, this
would have led to a never-ending international conflict regarding the sta-
tus of foreign direct investment as well as, more generally, the recogni-
tion and scope of the right to property. True, this was an area more
conflict-prone in 1944 than it is today, as has been shown by the recent
worldwide privatization drive and the collapse of command, or State-
controlled, economies. It was, however, a wise decision in 1944 to leave
this controversial issue out of the World Bank's statutes and to rely on
specific and lateral approaches such as those in the 1965 International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and 1985 Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency conventions.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
A. The Case of the IMF
During its first years of activity, the existence of the IMF passed
largely unnoticed. Most of its future key members-European nations-
19. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. I(i), 60 Stat. 1440, 1440.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. III, § 5(b), 60 Stat. 1440, 1444.
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were undergoing their reconstruction process and were placed under the
benign protection of the United States through the constraints of the fa-
mous and enlightened "Marshall Plan." When the Western nations'
economies began to recover, as shown by their return to currency con-
vertibility in the early 1960s, the IMF began to play an active role on the
international monetary scene. The Fund reached its hey-day in 1969
with the first amendment to its Articles of Agreement,23 whereby it re-
ceived the unprecedented power of issuing a new international conven-
tional currency with "special drawing rights"-SDRs.24 However, as we
all know, the Tarpeian Rock is not far from the Capitol, and the IMFs
initial and newly-gained functions were to be drastically affected by two
major and largely unpredictable developments. Firstly, its normative
role disintegrated due to the increasing volatility of the exchange rates of
its key member States, which resulted in basic modifications officialized
in the second amendment to its Articles of Agreement in 1978." Sec-
ondly, the emergence and dramatic growth of the "Euro-Markets" grad-
ually gave birth to a parallel and private international monetary system,
which both unsettled and profoundly modified the IMFs assistance
function.26
1. The Contraction of the IMF's Normative Powers: The Demise of
the Original Par Value System
Undoubtedly, the most characteristic and revolutionary aspect of the
code of good monetary conduct established by the IMF Articles of
Agreement of 1944 resided in the creation of an international exchange
rate regime controlled and administered by the Fund. Never in the past
had States accepted strict commitments concerning the definition and
implementation of their exchange rate. Reflecting on the pre-Bretton
Woods state of international law in this area with regard to the well-
known Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases27 of 1929, the Permanent
Court of International Justice asserted that "[i]t is indeed a generally
accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency." 2
In concrete terms, this meant that States were entirely free to define the
value of their respective currencies as they saw fit, which implied an un-
23. Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775.
24. See Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, July 28, 1969, art. XXI, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 2781.
25. See Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, Apr. 1, 1978, art. VI, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2208.
26. See Leonard Gomes, The International Adjustment Mechanism: From the Gold
Standard to the EMS 265-67 (1993) (discussing the rise and role of the Euro-Markets and
the subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods twins).
27. Brazilian Loans (Fr. v. Braz.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) Nos. 14/15 (July 12);
Serbian Loans (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) Nos. 14/15 (July 12).
28. Serbian Loans at 44.
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limited power to resort to monetary tactics such as devaluation-by far
the most frequent-and re-evaluation.
The Fund's Articles of Agreement drastically altered that aspect of
customary international law. By ratifying the Fund's constitutive Char-
ter and becoming members, States agreed (i) to evaluate their currencies
in terms of gold, which then became the "common denominator" of all
monetary units;2 9 (ii) to stabilize the evaluated value within strict limits
(plus or minus one percent);30 and (iii) not to modify such par value
without notifying, and in most instances obtaining the prior agreement
of, the IMF.31 In short, the Bretton Woods system officialized and made
mandatory a regime of stable-but not fixed-exchange rates under the
supervision of the IMF, thus preventing the opposite situation that had
prevailed during the 1930s and that had been associated with the infa-
mous "beggar-my-neighbor policy" of freely fluctuating currencies.32 In
addition, members that had agreed to make their currencies convertible
into gold for only official holders-as opposed to private ones-were
deemed to satisfy their monetary obligations in terms of currency stabil-
ity.33 At the time, the United States proved to be the only country that
felt strong enough to open this gold window and accept the conversion
into gold of United States dollars held abroad by official institutions
(such as central banks, national treasuries, or governments).
This (briefly summarized and simplified) par value system served the
world well for about a quarter of a century despite several transitional
crises. But, on August 15, 1971, it collapsed. That day proved to be a
turning point in the history of the post-war international monetary sys-
tem. President Richard M. Nixon announced two key decisions, 34 one
entirely lawful, and the other in complete contradiction of United States
obligations towards the IMF and its member States. The first was to
announce the suspension of the United States dollar's gold convertibility
for official foreign holders of United States currency, 35 thus closing down
the above-mentioned gold window. 36 Since gold convertibility was in no
way mandatory and was purely optional, no international commitment
was at stake. The second and much more important announcement was
that the United States dollar would be set free from any international
29. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. IV, § l(a), 60 Stat. 1401, 1403.
30. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. IV, § 2, 60 Stat. 1401, 1404.
31. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. IV, § 5, 60 Stat. 1401, 1404.
32. See Magret G. de Vries, The Par Value System: An Overview, in 2 The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund 1945-65: Twenty Years of International Cooperation 39 (J. Keith
Horsefield ed., 1969).
33. See id. at 40-43.
34. See The Challenge of Peace, 7 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1168, 1170 (Aug. 21,
1971).
35. See id.
36. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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stability constraints and that it would, in short, float.3" With this second
decision, the main founding member of the IMF blatantly violated the
core element of the par value system set forth in the Articles of Agree-
ment. In order to abide by its then-existing international commitment,
the United States should have, after suspending the gold convertibility of
the dollar, allowed its currency to fluctuate within the permitted band on
the domestic exchange market like every other IMF member State.
By refusing to place the dollar at par with other world currencies, the
United States inflicted a severe blow on the international monetary sys-
tem and on the Fund that managed and controlled the system-a blow
from which neither the system nor the Fund ever fully recovered. Over
the next few years, chaos reigned in international monetary relations. In
theory, that unfortunate phase ended in 1978 with the entry into force of
the second amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement, which val-
iantly attempted to re-introduce some rule of law into the field of ex-
change rates.3" In reality, the new exchange provisions of the revised
IMF Charter merely legalized the prevailing monetary situation, which
in fact meant that floating exchange rates were officially recognized.
Such a system, or rather "non-system," carries a lot of appeal for
States as they are freed from the constraints of the exchange markets
when implementing their economic policy. In other words, with the sec-
ond amendment of 1978, IMF member States recovered most of the
monetary sovereignty that they had previously agreed to relinquish.
From the Fund's point of view, this reform consisted of a marked dim-
inution of its role as a normative institution that could not be veiled by
the grand language used to describe its new function of "surveillance
over exchange arrangements." While its member States have regained
the freedom to adopt the exchange rate policies of their choice, the Fund
has lost the freedom to exercise control in many areas. Soft law norms
are, by definition, unmanageable.
2. The Modification of the IMF's Assistance Function: The
Challenge of the Euro-Markets
While the IMF's reduced normative role is attributable to its members'
unruly conduct, the changing direction of its assistance activities is the
outcome of the creation and prodigious rise of the "Euro-Markets," a
phenomenon that was difficult to anticipate and assess at the Fund's
creation.
In the early 1960s, thanks to the gradual liberalization of capital move-
ments, two truly international, or "off-shore," markets were born. On a
short-term basis, international banks-domestic banks with international
37. See The Challenge of Peace, 7 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1168, 1170 (Aug. 21,
1971).
38. See Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203; see also Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944, art. IV, §§ 4, 5, 8, 60 Stat. 1401, 1404-05.
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activities-receiving deposits from international clients started re-lending
to foreign customers in need, thus fulfilling their traditional role of inter-
mediary. By so doing, a true international money market came into be-
ing. A term was coined to describe such international deposit and
lending activities: the Euro-Currency market. 39 On a long-term basis,
these international banks tapped the international financial markets to
place bond issues for their clients: the Euro-Bond market was born.40
When they were created, these markets went largely unnoticed because
they were aimed at serving the financing needs of transnational corpora-
tions. States maintained a benign neglect policy regarding these new de-
velopments as they enabled "their" domestic corporations to raise funds
on international markets that could not be obtained from domestic
sources, except at a high cost. In other words, nation States adopted a
very convenient "hands-off" policy.
During the first oil crisis of 1973-74, the Euro-Markets, in particular
the Euro-Currency market, became critically important to the States and
their agencies.4 1 The tremendous increase in oil prices resulted in mas-
sive balance of payments surpluses for oil-exporting nations and corre-
sponding massive deficits for oil-importing nations.42 This new situation
provided a golden opportunity for international banks. They received
huge new deposits from oil-exporting States and their financial institu-
tions (the so-called "surplus" or "petro" dollars)43 and were more than
eager to lend this money to customers in need such as States facing bal-
ance of payments difficulties because of the dramatic increase in oil
prices. Thus, the petro-dollar recycling phenomenon was born.
4
Several lessons should be drawn from this aspect of the oil crisis of the
early 1970s. First, States or their agencies operated in the international
Euro-Markets either as lenders or borrowers. The Euro-Markets proved
to be the only place, or rather mechanism, through which such huge
sums of money could be effectively channeled for lending and borrowing.
Second, the IMF response-the setting up of a meager "Oil facility"-
was a poor alternative to the achievements of the Euro-Markets. In
terms of sheer numbers, the Euro-Markets were better equipped than the
IMF to provide an adequate response to this major financial crisis.
Moreover-and this is a key factor-the IMF's assistance at any level
is always conditional.45 The conditionality of IMF loans is explained not
only by the Fund's obligation to ensure that its resources continue to
39. See Richard W. Edwards, Jr., International Monetary Collaborations 128-33
(1991).
40. See id. at 133-35.
41. See Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945-1981, at 316-33
(1982).
42. See id. at 316.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 325-28.
45. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. V, 60 Stat. 1401, 1406.
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revolve in order to be available to other members;41 but, the criteria and
conditions set up over the years by the IMF aimed at persuading, or
rather forcing, member States seeking financial assistance to adopt stabi-
lization plans to reduce the various internal and external imbalances at
the root of international financial difficulties. Member States receiving
IMF assistance are thus placed in a position of international financial
trusteeship. Understandably, the member States try to avoid this un-
pleasant situation that is somewhat reminiscent of the not-so-distant co-
lonial past.
On the contrary, bank lending is based on purely financial criteria,
namely the borrower's ability to repay its loans as perceived and assessed
by the lender. In other words, the conditions imposed by international
banks in the Euro-Markets are, and incidentally can only be, of a purely
financial nature. This quite natural difference in approach became mani-
festly clear during the oil crisis of 1973-74 and this drastically affected
the development of the IMF's mission of financial assistance and its role
as an international institution.
IMF members facing balance of payment difficulties and in need of
international financial assistance may be classified in two categories. The
first includes States that are financially viable-or credit-worthy in bank
parlance. They may tap Euro-Market resources without difficulty as
they are viewed as potentially good debtors by international banks. Such
States have easy access to the international loan market and can obtain
credit on commercial terms with no strings attached. This category
broadly covers Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment member States-a club of the twenty-four wealthiest nations in the
world 4 -and newly industrialized countries, including relatively affluent
nations such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
These States are able to bypass the IMF and its constraints since they do
not need to solicit financial aid. Conversely, the Fund is not in a position
to use its financial leverage to influence these States' policies.
Presently, since the loss of its principal normative function in the ex-
change rate field, the IMF's role seems limited to controlling the econo-
mies of member States requesting financial assistance, namely developing
countries and former command economy countries that have no alterna-
tive sources of outside financing. Moreover, this trend has been rein-
forced by the international banks operating on the Euro-Markets as they
have made the conclusion of appropriate credit arrangements with the
IMF a condition precedent to their loans to developing or transforming
countries. Stabilization programs sponsored and approved by the Fund
constitute a seal of international approval of a State's economic policies
that acts as a de facto guarantee for prospective private lenders.
46. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 1-22, 1944,
art. V, § 3(a)(iii), 60 Stat. 1401, 1406-09.
47. See Edwards, supra note 39, at 68-74.
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Faced with this systemic development over which it has no control,
the IMF wisely decided to go along with it in order to maintain its oper-
ating role in the world of international finance. Thus, over the years, the
IMF adjusted to its new environment by creating special financial mech-
anisms providing easier access to its resources for member States in need.
Virtually all of the new "facilities"-the term used to describe these new
techniques-had the common aim of better serving the needs of the
Fund's developing members: to wit, the "Compensatory and Contin-
gency Planning Facility," the "Extended Fund Facility," the "Structural
Adjustment Facility," and the "Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facil-
ity." Moreover, in April 1993, a new "temporary" facility was set up--
the "Systemic Transformation Facility"-to extend financial assistance
to countries facing balance of payments difficulties brought about by the
transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy.
Gradually and involuntarily, the IMF has lost its influence over its
most developed member States, which remain bound by very limited
monetary obligations since the collapse of the par value system in 1971
and which have abstained from turning to the IMF for assistance both
quantitatively limited and qualitatively restrictive because of the condi-
tions imposed. At the same time, because it is de facto confined to lend-
ing to developing countries, the IMF has been obliged to sponsor, or
rather impose, stabilization programs based on sound, liberal economic
policies. It thereby exposes itself to strong criticism for interfering with
the domestic affairs of its weakest members and placing them under a
subtle and covert form of international tutelage. This role has been fur-
ther reinforced by the Fund's successful handling of the international
debt problem that came to the surface when Mexico defaulted on its
loans in August, 1982 and which was followed by a plethora of similar
crises. The IMF thus became involved in managing the long-term eco-
nomic policies of its developing and "transforming" members. Its assist-
ance, originally limited to financing short-term difficulties, has been
completely modified to address long-term, structural imbalances. And
this is precisely the World Bank's basic mission.
B. The Case of the World Bank
Pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, the Bank's lending policy was
to be dictated by purely financial considerations, which meant, in con-
crete terms, that the projects financed in member States should be sound
and should generate returns sufficient to repay the loan.48 This initial
concept corresponds to the World Bank's primary function as envisioned
by its founding members. 49 As an intergovernmental bank, it was as-
sumed that the World Bank would enjoy the best credit rating available
48. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. III, 60 Stat. 1440, 1443-45.
49. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. I, 60 Stat. 1440, 1440-41.
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that would ensure cheap and easy access to international and domestic
financial markets. Subsequently, such funds could be re-lent by the Bank
to its member States who would then enjoy preferential conditions that
they would never have been able to obtain alone. However, to ensure
that the World Bank itself would be able to meet its obligations to its
lenders, it prudently limited its loans to financially sound projects."
This general approach was more than sensible and is common to every
respectable bank in the world. Specifically, the World Bank's Articles of
Agreement expressly prohibit the Bank from granting loans based on
"political or other non-economic influences or considerations." 51
Though the World Bank strictly limited its loans to profit-generating
projects during its early years, it started deviating from that course in the
early 1960s largely as a result of pressure from its developing members
who had become its only "clients" once the reconstruction process in
Europe had been completed. Thus, projects that could not be viewed as
purely profit-oriented but that would obviously contribute to the overall
development of member States became eligible for World Bank loans.
The World Bank thus agreed to finance projects in new areas such as
education, population (family planning), health, nutrition, and urban
development.
In so doing, the Bank increased its financial exposure as many assisted
projects did not generate any income. This required borrowing member
States to earmark funds from their already limited foreign exchange re-
sources to reimburse the Bank. It was thus not surprising that the World
Bank had to face defaults-albeit provisional-by some member States.
These loans were tactfully described as having "non-accrual status." In
other words, the World Bank is being plagued, although to a lesser de-
gree, by the same financial problems as the IMF because of payment
arrears by some member States.
More recently, in the mid-1980s, the World Bank embraced a broader
vision of its role in the development process by deciding to grant loans
for adjustment purposes either in given sectors (sector-adjustment loans)
or for national economies as a whole (structural-adjustment loans). By
broadening its financing activities in this way, the World Bank had to
develop a different approach to its lending policy that was less technical
("Is the project profitable?") and more policy-oriented ("Is the adjust-
ment operation sufficiently effective for development?").
Thus, the concept of "conditionality" (a cornerstone of the IMFs
credit policy) has gradually become a part of the World Bank's lending
practice. The conditions now "imposed" by the World Bank are largely
similar to those prevailing for IMF member States. In order to be eligi-
ble for assistance, World Bank member States must put their houses in
50. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. III, § 4, 60 Stat. 1440, 1444.
51. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank For Reconstruction and De-
velopment, July 1-22, 1944, art. IIl, § 5(b), 60 Stat. 1440, 1444.
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order regarding such areas as inflation, public deficits, liberalization of
foreign trade and investment, exchange rates, and land and tax reforms.
Except for minor differences, the conditions imposed by the Bretton
Woods twins are largely interchangeable.
CONCLUSION
The fact that the development of the IMF and the World Bank has
converged is significant for their (largely) common member States. First,
member States run the risk of having to satisfy more conditions if they
request the assistance of both Bretton Woods institutions at the same
time. Second, because the macro-economic conditions "imposed" by the
IMF and the World Bank are similar, credit refusals or approvals will
usually be granted simultaneously by both institutions. Thus, a country
failing to gain access to IMF resources for not meeting certain criteria
has little chance of being more successful with the World Bank. Is this
justifiable? Reasonable doubts could be raised if the two Bretton Woods
institutions in fact pursued different missions. However, because their
main purposes have turned out to be largely the same-assisting develop-
ing and transforming countries-the question arises whether the singu-
larities of their respective operating techniques justify the continued
separate existence of the IMF and the World Bank. This issue must be
left open. It is, however, a matter that deserves to be debated.
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